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THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND PROCEDURES
FOR DETERMINING DEATH ROW
INMATE SANITY:
FORD v. WAINWRIGHT,
106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986)
For the past seven hundred years, courts refused to execute pres-
ently' insane persons.' Although the reasons for this policy are un-
clear,3 the courts "firmly enshrined" 4 in the common law5 this refusal
to execute the insane. Presently, no state with the death penalty allows
execution of the insane.6 The United States Supreme Court incorpo-
1. The author uses the word "presently" to distinguish between incompetency at the
time of the offense and at trial and incompetency at the time of execution. This Com-
ment deals only with a prisoner's incompetency at the time of execution. See Note, The
Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV.
765 n.4 (1980).
2. See, e.g., Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 569 (1953); Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d
1048, 1053 (5th Cir. 1983); Note, supra note 1, at 778; Hazard and Louisell, Death, the
State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381 (1962).
3. See, e.g., Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 16-19 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Hazard and
Louisell, supra note 2, at 382-89; Note, supra note 1, at 778-80; Feltham, infra note 5, at
468. To Coke, the execution of an insane man was a "miserable spectacle," and failed
to serve a deterrent purpose. COKE, THIRD INSTITUTES 6 (1644). To Hawles, the in-
sane person could not be executed because he would be unable to present his best de-
fense. Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 STATE TRIALS 474
(1816); accord, 1 HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34-35 (1736).
According to Blackstone, the insane should not be executed for two reasons: first,
"madness is punishment in itself," second, the insane person might be unable to give a
reason why he should not be executed, which he might give if he were sane. 4 BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 24-25 (1768).
4. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evidence, Dec. , 1949, 13
(1950).
5. For a discussion of the common law background, see generally Feltham, The
Common Law and The Execution of Insane Criminals, 4 MELB. U. L. REV. 434 (1964)
(hereinafter cited as Feltham).
6. 41 of the 50 states have a death penalty. Of those 41, 26 explicitly prohibit execu-
tion of the insane. See ALA. CODE § 15-16-23 (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
4023 (1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2622 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3703
(West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-112(2) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-101
Washington University Open Scholarship
204 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 33:203
rated this general rule into the eighth amendment 7 in Ford v. Wain-
wright,8 holding inadequate Florida's procedure9 for determining the
(1985); FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-62 (1982); ILL. REV.
STAT., ch. 38, 1005-2-3 (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4006(3) (1981); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 431.240(2) (1985); MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 17, § 75(c) (1985 Supp.); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-57(2) (Supp. 1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 552.060 (1978); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-14-221 (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2537 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 176.445 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82 (West 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-6
(1984); N.Y. CORREC. LAw § 656 (McKinney Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1001 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.29 (1982); OKLA. STAT., tit. 22, § 1008
(1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-24 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-
13 (1982); Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-901 (Supp. 1985).
Other states, such as Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington adopted
the common law rule by judicial decision. See State v. Allen, 204 La. 513, 515, 15 So.
2d 870, 871 (1943); Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 22-23, 117 A.2d 96, 99 (1955);
Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 89-90, 135 S.W. 327, 329 (1911); State v. Davis, 6 Wash.
2d 696, 717, 108 P.2d 641, 651 (1940). Some states, however, have statutes which are
more discretionary in nature. For example, Delaware, Indiana, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia provide for the suspension of sentence and
transfer to a mental facility upon a prisoner's development of mental illness. The re-
maining four states which have the death penalty, Idaho, New Hampshire, North Caro-
lina, and Vermont, lack a specific procedure to deal with condemned insane prisoners,
These four states fail to completely abrogate the rule against the execution of those
prisoners. See Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2601-02 n.2 (1986).
7. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
8. 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
9. Section 922.07 of Florida's statute provides for this procedure and states in perti-
nent part:
(1) When the Governor is informed that a person under sentence of death may be
insane, he shall stay execution of the sentence and appoint a commission of three
psychiatrists to examine the convicted person. The Governor shall notify the psy-
chiatrists to examine the convicted person. The Governor shall notify the psychia-
trists in writing that they are to examine the convicted person to determine
whether he understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is to
be imposed upon him. The examination of the convicted person shall take place
with all three psychiatrists present at the same time. Counsel for the convicted
person and the state attorney may be present at the examination....
(2) After receiving the report of the commission, if the Governor decides that the
convicted person has the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death
penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him, he shall issue a warrant to
the warden directing him to execute the sentence. ...
(3) If the Governor decides that the convicted person does not have the mental
capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed on
him, he shall have him committed to a Department of Corrections mental health
treatment facility.
(4) When a person under sentence of death has been committed to a Department
of Corrections mental health treatment facility, he shall be kept there until the
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sanity of a condemned prisoner.'°
In Ford a Florida state court sentenced to death the petitioner Alvin
Ford, a convicted murderer." Although Ford was sane both when he
committed the crime and at trial,' 2 he claimed that he became insane
while on death row.' 3 Pursuant to Florida's procedure for determining
condemned prisoners' competence,' 4 the governor appointed three psy-
chiatrists to examine Ford. After a single thirty-minute interview dur-
ing which Ford's counsel was unable to cross-examine the psychiatrists
or present evidence on Ford's behalf,'5 all three doctors agreed that
Ford was competent' 6 to be executed.'7 The governor then signed
Ford's death warrant.' 8
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
facility administrator determines that he has been restored to sanity. The facility
and the Governor shall appoint another commission to proceed as provided in sub-
section (1).
FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985).
10. 106 S. Ct. at 2606.
11. Ford previously litigated the validity of his conviction and death sentence. Ford
v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 201 (1983).
12. 106 S. Ct. at 2598.
13. Ford believed that he was a Ku Klux Klan conspiracy target and that the Klan
designed the conspiracy to force him to commit suicide. Id. Ford also believed that the
conspirators took his family and friends hostage, and were torturing them somewhere
within the prison. Id. Later, Ford claimed that he ended the "crisis" by firing a
number of prison officials and by appointing new members to the Florida Supreme
Court. Id. Ford's behavior gradually deteriorated, and he became incomprehensible.
Id. at 2599. Ford's psychiatrist concluded that Ford suffered from "Paranoid Schizo-
phrenia With Suicide Potential." Id. at 2598.
14. FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985). See supra note 9 for pertinent text.
15. The governor specifically ordered the attorneys to refrain from participation in
the examination, in harmony with his policy against advocacy in sanity determination
proceedings. Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1984).
16. Florida's competency standard is "whether he understands the nature and effect
of the death penalty and why it is to be imposed on him." FLA. STAT. § 922.07(1)
(1985). As one commentator observed, "[t]o give someone her just deserts implies her
recognition that those deserts are just." Gale, Retribution, Punishment, and Death, 18
U.C.D. L. REV. 973, 1031 (1985).
17. Two of the three state-appointed psychiatrists found that Ford was psychotic.
Nonetheless, they concluded that he was competent to be executed. Brief for Petitioner
at 4-6, Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
18. Ford's counsel submitted certain written materials, including evidence both of
Ford's mental illness and of conflicts among the three state-appointed psychiatrists'
opinions, to the governor. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595
(1986). The governor failed to indicate whether he considered those materials. He
signed Ford's death warrant without explanation or statement. 106 S. Ct. at 2604.
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denied Ford's habeas corpus petition,' 9 stating that he had no entitle-
ment to a de novo evidentiary hearing to redetermine his competency.2"
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of
probable cause21 and stayed the execution. 2 After the Supreme Court
rejected the state's effort to vacate the stay, 3 the court of appeals af-
firmed the district court's denial of habeas corpus, 24 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. z5
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
"cruel and unusual punishment,, 2 6 but fails to further delineate the
prohibition's scope.2 ' This failure forced the courts to develop and ap-
ply standards2" for the numerous contexts in which eighth amendment
19. Id. at 2599.
20. Id.
21. The court granted the certificate because Ford "presented substantial grounds
upon which relief could be granted." Ford v. Strickland, 734 F.2d 538, 543 (1 1th Cir.
1984) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3395 (1983)).
22. 734 F.2d at 543.
23. Wainwright v. Ford, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984).
24. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526, 528 (1lth Cir. 1985).
25. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 566 (1985).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
27. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-101 (1958), the Court stated:
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase "cruel and unusual" has not been
detailed by this Court. But the basic policy underlying these words is firmly estab-
lished in the Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice .... The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While
the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power
be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. . . . [T]he words of the
Amendment are not precise, and ... their scope is not static. The Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society.
See also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 369 (1910); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 263 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-73
(1976); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675-77 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(describing various punishments deemed cruel and unusual).
28. The Court developed a two-part standard to determine whether a punishment is
cruel and unusual. The punishment must be acceptable to "contemporary standards of
decency" and must uphold the "dignity of man." See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01. See also
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173-75. See generally Note, supra note I, at 775. The Supreme
Court also emphasized that punishment must be proportionate to the crime to be consti-
tutional. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983); Weems, 217 U.S. at 368;
Trop, 356 U.S. at 100. But see Furman, 408 U.S. at 378 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (the
cruel and unusual punishment clause protects only against punishments that are "ex-
tremely cruel.")
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claims arise.29 Courts had not yet decided whether executing an insane
person violates the eighth amendment.3" State legislatures incorpo-
rated the common law prohibition against such executions into law3 1
and enacted procedures for determining an inmate's sanity.32
The eighth amendment did not apply to the states through incorpo-
ration into the fourteenth amendment 33 until 1962. 3 ' Therefore, prior
to 1962, courts presented with challenges to state procedures for deter-
mining sanity based their decisions solely on the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause.35 For example, in Nobles v. Georgia36 the
United States Supreme Court held that due process failed to require a
jury trial for determining a petitioner's competency to be executed.37
Instead, the decision of whether a prisoner had a meritorious claim of
29. See Solem, 463 U.S. 277 (life sentence without possibility of parole for seventh
nonviolent felony conviction held to be cruel and unusual); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977) (death penalty for rape conviction was "grossly disproportionate" and there-
fore cruel and unusual); Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (death penalty held cruel and unusual);
Robinson, 370 U.S. 660 (California statute making drug addiction a misdemeanor pun-
ishable by imprisonment violated the eighth amendment); Trop, 356 U.S. 86 (expatria-
tion for desertion during wartime constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Weems,
217 U.S. 349 (cadena temporal, a punishment involving hard labor in chains and loss of
citizenship rights held to be cruel and unusual). But see Gregg, 428 U.S. 153 (death
penalty does not always violate the eighth amendment); Louisiana ex reL Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (state's second attempt at electrocution because first
attempt failed did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); In re Kemmler, 136
U.S. 436 (1890) (death by electrocution did not violate eighth amendment).
30. See Note, supra note 1, at 766.
3 1. For a list of these statutes, see supra note 6. State courts also recognized the
prohibition against executing the presently incompetent. See, e.g., Ex parte Chesser, 93
Fla. 590, 112 So. 87 (1927); People v. Scott, 326 Ill. 327, 157 N.E. 247 (1927); State v.
Allen, 204 La. 513, 15 So. 2d 870 (1943); Hawie v. State, 121 Miss. 197, 83 So. 158
(1919); Barker v. State, 75 Neb. 289, 106 N.W. 450 (1905); In re Smith, 25 N.M. 48,
176 P. 819 (1918).
32. The common law lacked an established procedure for determining a prisoner's
sanity; it was completely within the judge's discretion. See, eg., Nobles v. Georgia, 168
U.S. 398, 407 (1897); Hazard and Louisell, supra note 2, at 389-90. Presently, a few
states, such as Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Texas, still adhere to the common law rule,
leaving the matter up to the judge's discretion. Other states, including Arkansas, Geor-
gia, New Hampshire, Florida, and Massachusetts, grant the governor discretion to stay
the execution. See Note, supra note 1, at 780-81, n.71-72.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
34. Robinson v. California. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For pertinent language, see supra note 33.
36. 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
37. Id. at 409.
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incompetence was within the judge's discretion.38 The Court argued
that if the petitioner had an absolute right to a jury trial, she could
avoid execution altogether simply by repeatedly claiming insanity.3 9
Over fifty years later, in Solesbee v. Balkcom4 o the Supreme Court,
citing Nobles,41 upheld Georgia's statute prescribing procedures for de-
termining the sanity of death row inmates.42 The statute gave the gov-
ernor discretion to decide which claims had merit.4 3 If a death row
prisoner's claim had merit, the statute authorized the governor to ap-
point physicians to examine the prisoner and, in appropriate cases, to
postpone44 execution.45 The Court held that the petitioner lacked a
fourteenth amendment right to a judicial sanity determination46 be-
cause the governor, with the aid of expert physicians, was an appropri-
38. The Court stated that at common law the judge was in a better position to take
action, rather than summon a jury and have another trial. Id. at 407. For a discussion
of different state approaches to the procedural issue, see supra note 32 and accompany-
ing text.
39. Nobles, 168 U.S. at 406.
40. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
41. The Court in Solesbee stated that Nobles required that the judge be given broad
discretion in deciding whether to allow evidence of insanity. As this decision was non-
reviewable by appellate courts, it was important for the judge to use his conscience and
sound wisdom in making the decision. Id. at 13.
42. The Solesbee Court interpreted GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2602 (1903) which pro-
vided in pertinent part:
Upon satisfactory evidence being offered to the Governor that the person convicted
of a capital offense has become insane subsequent to his conviction, the Governor
may, within his discretion, have said person examined by such expert physicians as
the Governor may choose; and said physicians shall report to the Governor the
result of their investigation; and the Governor may, if he shall determine that the
person convicted has become insane, have the power of committing him to the
State Hospital until his sanity shall have been restored ...
The current version of this provision is substantially the same as the 1903 version. See
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-61 (1982).
43. The Solesbee petitioner claimed a fourteenth amendment right to a judicial or
administrative hearing to determine his sanity, which would require counsel to repre-
sent him, cross-examine witnesses, and offer evidence of his insanity. Solesbee, 339 U.S.
at 13. The Ford petitioner claimed the same rights as the Solesbee petitioner. See supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
44. That is, when the court deems the prisoner competent, it will carry out the
execution. Therefore, these cases involve the question of when, instead of whether, the
execution will occur. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2610 (1986) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
45. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2602 (1903). See supra note 42 for the relevant statutory
language.
46. 339 U.S. at 14.
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ate tribunal for making this determination. 7 The Court reasoned that
the power to postpone execution is similar to a governor's traditional
power to reprieve.4" Furthermore, for the governor's discretionary
power to be fully effective, and not merely an opportunity for the pris-
oner to avoid execution,4 9 it was necessary for the power to be
nonreviewable °
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its Solesbee holding in Caritativo v.
California.1 Caritativo involved a due process challenge to Califor-
nia's procedure for determining the competency of prisoners to be exe-
cuted. 2 California's statute differed from the Georgia statute in
Solesbee 53 because California required that the state prison warden ini-
tiate competency proceedings if he reasonably believed54 a prisoner to
be insane. Thus, in upholding California's statute, the Court in fact
extended Solesbee" by allowing prison wardens to wield the same
powers which courts traditionally entrusted only to governors.:
5 6
In 1962, the Supreme Court changed the constitutional analysis of
47 The Court deemed the governor an "apt and special tribunal" for making these
determinations. Id. at 12.
48, Id. at 11-12.
49. If the Court entitled the prisoner to a judicial review every time he claimed
insanity, he could theoretically avoid execution simply by making repeated claims of
insanity, Id. at 12-13. The Court discussed this issue in Nobles. See supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
50, According to the Court, granting the state's highest executive nonreviewable
discretion is permissible. 339 U.S. at 13. See supra note 41 and accompanying text for
the Solesbee Court's additional statements regarding the governor's discretion.
Justice Frankfurter dissented in Solesbee. He disagreed with the argument that the
state should have ultimate control over the prisoner's insanity claim. 339 U.S. at 21.
Frankfurter argued that as the prisoner has a right not to be executed while insane, the
determination of insanity must not be discretionary. Rather, the court must base that
determination on sound information. Id. at 23.
51, 357 U.S. 549 (1958).
52. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3700, 3701 (Deering 1980) sets forth California's proce-
dure for determining a condemned inmate's sanity. The statute provides for ajury trial,
but only after the prison warden initiates the proceedings.
53. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2602 (1903). See supra note 42 for the relevant statutory
language.
54, CAL. PENAL CODE § 3701 (Deering 1980).
55. 357 U.S. at 552 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (life and death decisions may now
be made on the "mere say-so" of a prison warden).
56. Governors traditionally had the power to reprieve. The Solesbee Court stated
that the power to postpone is much like the power to reprieve. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
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cases involving insane condemned prisoners. In Robinson v. Califor-
nia57 the Court held that the eighth amendment applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. 8 After Robinson, therefore, con-
demned prisoners could challenge state procedures for determining
competency to be executed on both eighth amendment and fourteenth
amendment grounds.5 9
In Ford v. Wainwright 60 the Supreme Court confronted for the first
time the issue of the execution of insane persons under both the eighth
and fourteenth amendments. Noting that it failed to decide Nobles,61
Solesbee,62 and Caritativo 63 on eighth amendment grounds, 64 the Court
held that the eighth amendment prohibits the execution of prisoners
deemed insane.65 The common law66 and modem statutory law sup-
port this holding.6 7
In addition to finding an eighth amendment prohibition against exe-
cuting insane persons, the Ford Court held that Florida's procedure for
determining condemned prisoners' sanity68 was inadequate to protect
this constitutional right.69 Therefore, Ford was entitled to a de novo
evidentiary hearing to determine his sanity.70
57. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). A California statute made narcotics addiction a misde-
meanor punishable by imprisonment. The Robinson Court held that the statute inflicted
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Id. at 667.
58. Id.
59. The first time a petitioner made such a challenge on eighth amendment grounds,
he was unsuccessful. See Goode v. Wainwright, 731 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1984). How-
ever, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Goode
did not control Ford. The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Ford from Goode because the
courts in two prior proceedings found the Goode petitioner competent. See Ford v.
Strickland, 734 F.2d 538, 540 (11th Cir. 1984). Goode failed to reach the Supreme
Court.
60. 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
61. 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
62. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
63. 357 U.S. 549 (1958).
64. 106 S. Ct. at 2600.
65. Id. at 2602.
66. Id. at 2600-01. For a discussion of the common law prohibition against execut-
ing insane persons, see supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 2601-02. For a discussion of modern statutory approaches to the rule
against executing insane persons, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
68. FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985). See supra note 9 for the pertinent statutory text.
69. 106 S. Ct. at 2605.
70. Federal habeas corpus standards, set forth in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
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The Court found that Florida's procedure inadequately protected
Ford's eighth amendment right not to be executed while insane for
three reasons. First, the procedure failed to include the prisoner in the
truth-seeking process. 1 Second, the prisoner and his counsel lacked an
opportunity to cross-examine or impeach the governor's psychiatrists'
opinions during their thirty-minute interview.72 Third, Florida's pro-
cedure placed all decision-making authority in the executive branch.7"
After recognizing these defects and the fact that Ford's life was at
stake,74 the Court concluded that Florida's sanity determination proce-
dure could easily lead to unreliability and prejudice of the petitioner's
interests.75
Justice Powell concurred in part, but stated that the due process re-
quirements in this context were not as great as the majority believed.7 6
Powell felt that the state's interest in carrying out the sentence was
compelling. 77 Moreover, the state could validly presume Ford's sanity
at the time of execution because of his continued sanity throughout the
trial and sentencing. 78 For these reasons, Justice Powell believed that
Ford had no right to a full sanity hearing.79
(1963) and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1966), require such a hearing if the state's
factfinding procedure was inadequate or unfair. The statute requires a federal eviden-
tiary hearing if (1) the state court's procedure inadequately affords a full and fair hear-
ing, or (2) the state trier of fact failed to afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact
hearing. 372 U.S. at 313.
71. The statute completely barred the prisoner from presenting his insanity case.
106 S. Ct. at 2604. Although he submitted documentation of his illness to the governor,
it is unclear whether the governor considered it. See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
72. 106 S. Ct. at 2605. The Court stated that in light of the great possibility of bias
and inconsistent results, the ability to cross-examine psychiatrists becomes essential to
the discovery of truth. Id.
73. Id. "The commander of the State's corps of prosecutors cannot be said to have
the neutrality that is necessary for reliability in the factfinding proceeding." Id.
74. Id. at 2606.
75. To avoid such unreliability and prejudice, statutes must freely allow the flow of
information. Id. at 2606.
76. Id. at 2610.
77. The Court validly convicted and sentenced the prisoner; the question, therefore,
was not whether, but when the sentence would be imposed. Id.
78. The petitioner would have to make a "substantial" showing of insanity to over-
come this presumption. Id.
79. Justice Powell also noted that because the determination of a person's sanity is
subjective, the adversarial process, complete with cross-examination and witnesses, is
not the best way to make such a determination. Id. at 2611. Compare Feltham, supra
19881
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Justice O'Connor concurred in part. She argued that the eighth
amendment fails to prohibit the execution of insane prisoners.80 In
harmony with Justice Powell,81 she believed that the due process de-
mands in this context are minimal.8 2 She agreed with the result here,
however, because Florida, by prohibiting the execution of insane per-
sons, created an expectation but failed to provide adequate procedural
protection for that expectation. 3
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented. Justice
Rehnquist stated that the majority's holding was inconsistent with the
common law because at common law the executive, instead of the judi-
ciary, determined whether prisoners were competent to be executed.8 4
Only the governor, with the power to reprieve, should be able to post-
pone executions."' Furthermore, the dissenters disagreed with the ma-
jority's creation of a constitutional prohibition against the execution of
prisoners while insane.86 In doing so, the dissent rejected the major-
ity's justification that for centuries courts refused to recognize such
executions.
8 7
The Court in Ford made constitutional a long-standing principle that
insane persons cannot be executed and held that a state's procedures
for determining a condemned prisoner's sanity must meet certain basic
standards88 to fully protect the prisoner's eighth amendment right. In
contrast, Nobles, 9 Solesbee,90 and Caritativo91 found no constitutional
note 4, at 473. Feltham stated that if doubt exists regarding a sanity determination
procedure, the judiciary, whose impartiality is acknowledged, is in a better position than
the executive to make the determination. Id. Accord Note, supra note 1, at 801 (only a
judicial inquiry will satisfy the eighth amendment's requirements).
80. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2611 (1986).
81. For a discussion of Justice Powell's opinion, see supra notes 77-80 and accompa-
nying text.
82. 106 S. Ct. at 2612. To Justice O'Connor, in this context the potential for false
claims and deliberate delay is great. The petitioner who continually raised claims of
insanity up to the very moment of execution could exacerbate such dangers. Id.
83. Id. at 2613. The procedure did not provide an opportunity to be heard. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2614. For a discussion of this argument as initially raised in Solesbee, see
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
86. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2615 (1986).
87. Id.
88. For a discussion of federal habeas corpus standards, see supra note 70 and ac-
companying text.
89. 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
90. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
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right against executing an insane prisoner. Instead, only the state, as
an act of mercy, could spare the insane prisoner.92 Furthermore, Soles-
bee and Caritativo upheld state procedural statutes nearly identical to
that struck down in Ford." Although Ford seems to overrule Nobles,
Solesbee, and Caritativo because the Court decided Ford on eighth
amendment grounds, the prior cases on the fourteenth amendment
stand.
Ford is distinguishable from the prior cases because it arose after the
Court decided in Robinson that the eighth amendment applies to the
states.9 4 Although the Court decided the prior cases solely on four-
teenth amendment grounds," Ford relied on both the fourteenth and
eighth amendments. Thus, the Court interpreted the Constitution to
protect both the prisoner's due process rights, and his right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment.
A further distinction between the pre-Robinson cases and Ford is
that the Court in Ford granted the prisoner greater procedural protec-
tion because his right is constitutional. The prisoners in the pre-Ford
cases lacked such a right and therefore the statutes involved in the
cases prior to Ford adequately protected those prisoners. The pre-Ford
statutes needed only to protect the state's administrative grace. 96 Flor-
ida's statute in Ford, although similar to those in the prior cases, was
more highly scrutinized to ensure that it protected the prisoner's
newly-found eighth amendment rights and not just the state's mercy.
The Ford decision will clearly affect states allowing the death pen-
alty. States such as California9 7 and Georgia,9" which leave the sanity
determination to a state official, must reevaluate and amend their stat-
91. 357 U.S. 549 (1958).
92. For a discussion of the power to postpone execution as an act of mercy rather
than a constitutional right, see infra note 96 and accompanying text.
93. Solesbee involved GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2602 (1903). See supra note 42 for the
pertinent statutory language. Caritativo involved CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3700, 3701
(Deering 1980). For a discussion of this statute, see supra note 52 and accompanying
text. Ford involved FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985). See supra note 9 for the relevant statu-
tory language.
94. For a discussion of the difference between pre- and post-Robinson cases, see
supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
95. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I. For pertinent language, see supra note 33.
96. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 11 (1950).
97. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3703 (Deering 1980).
98. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-61 (1982).
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
214 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 33:203
utes to incorporate Ford's procedural adequacy standards.99 States
must hold a full evidentiary hearing to determine a condemned pris-
oner's sanity. Although the Court in Ford gave little guidance regard-
ing the exact level of procedural protection required, the Court clearly
stated that the prisoner must have a "full and fair hearing"'" to deter-
mine whether she is competent to be executed. Something more than a
governor's cursory review is therefore necessary.1 '
The decision in Ford adheres to both common law and modern stan-
dards. Since what was once an act of mercy is now a constitutional
right, the amount of procedural protection a court affords a death row
inmate should increase if the prisoner becomes insane.
Patricia L. Dysart
99. Five months after the Ford decision, the Florida Supreme Court amended Flor-
ida's Rules of Criminal Procedure to incorporate the Ford standards. In re Emergency
Amendment to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 3.811, Competency to be
Executed), 497 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1986).
Rule 3.811 provides:
(a) When proceedings under section 922.07, Florida Statutes (1985), are initiated,
and such proceedings result in a determination by the governor that the convicted
person under death sentence has the mental capacity to understand the nature of
the death penalty and why it is to be imposed upon that person, a judicial proceed-
ing is authorized to review that determination. Such a proceeding shall be insti-
tuted by a written motion by counsel for the prisoner asserting grounds why a
belief persists that the prisoner is not mentally competent to be executed....
The trial judge shall review the experts' reports and any written submissions
from the parties, including experts representing the prisoner. No evidentiary hear-
ing shall be required, but the trial judge, at his or her discretion, may allow the
parties to present oral argument and may permit or require the live testimony of
witnesses, including one or more of the experts.... [Emphasis added].
FLA. STAT. ANN. RULES CRIM. PROC. § 3.811 (Supp. 1987). Although this new rule
empowers the governor to make the initial sanity determination, it gives the trial judge
discretion to review those findings and to order an evidentiary hearing if necessary.
Thus, the sanity determination no longer lies exclusively with the executive branch.
Also, the new rule gives the petitioner a greater opportunity to participate in the pro-
ceedings, by allowing her to submit evidence of her own incompetence, and, if the trial
judge finds it appropriate, by presenting oral arguments and witnesses.
100. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2603 (1986). For a discussion of the
standards used in determining whether a hearing is "full and fair," see supra note 70
and accompanying text.
101. Id. at 2604. The new Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 3,811 seems to provide
for more than a cursory review. For a discussion of this new rule, see supra note 99.
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